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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JASON SCOTT SPITZER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 42990
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2014-17368

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Spitzer failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
possession of a stolen vehicle?
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Spitzer Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Spitzer pled guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle and the district court imposed
a unified sentence of three years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.50-52. 1) Spitzer filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.53-56.)
Spitzer asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his positive employment history and
his purported remorse for his actions. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) The record supports the
sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
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Citations to the Record are to the electronic file “Jason Scott Spitzer CR14-17368
42990.pdf.”
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The maximum prison sentence for possession of a stolen vehicle is five years.
I.C. §§ 49-228 and 18-112. The district court imposed a unified sentence of three
years, with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.5052.) At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to
its decision and also set forth in detail its reasons for imposing Spitzer’s sentence. (Tr.,
p.29, L.15 – p.31, L.19.) The state submits that Spitzer has failed to establish an abuse
of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Spitzer’s conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 17th day of September, 2015.

/s/
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

CATHERINE MINYARD
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of September, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
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defendant had an oppo1tunity to rea<l the presentence

have a horrible record. I think you know that. And the

2 investigation, discuss it with counsel. The Court finds
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2 Coun is not going to •• does not feel comfortable going

the defendant had an opportunity to explain, co11ect, or
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done so. The Court finds the defendant had an
opportunity to make a statement to the Court and has
done so.
The Court's considered those recommendations
contained in the presentence investigation, those of the
prosecuting anomey, and those of defense counsel in
this matter. Is there any legal reason why judgment
should not be imposed at this time?
MR.ROBrNS: No, your Honor.
MS. MARSHALL; No, your Honor.
TT-IF.COURT: Mr. Spitzer, it is ordered and it
is !he judgment of this Court that after you had been
advised of and waived your constitutional rights to
trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront
witnesses, and having pied guilty to the charge of
possession of a stolen vehicle in violation ofldahn
Code Section 49-228, that you are indeed guilty of that
crime. The Court finds that you had entered your plea
in a voluntary und intelligent manner along with the
assistance of counsel.
Mr. Spitzer, I think suffice it to say you
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in any particular case.
And the Court •. as counsel may know, this
Court h;u; distinguished between crimes that are what we
refer to as malum in se, meaning wrone in themselves,
and crimes that are malum prohibiturn, meaning the
legislature has decided, for whatever reason they found
fit, to define crimes that are just not wrong in
themselves. What I'm speaking of is theft in this case.
Everybody knows from the time you're a very small
person, a very small child, that it's wrong to steal
from people. And that's why this Court believes society
needs protection in this matter.
With that, I'm going to sentence you to the
Idaho State Board of Correction for a unified tem1 of
three years with two years fixed and one-year
indetenninate. You will receive credit for time served
in this matter. And hopefully after that time, that you
find your way back to California and your way to deal
with whatever the)' have in store for you there.
You're rt:manded to the custody of the sheriff
to await tra11spurmlio11 lo the Department of
Corrections. Oh, and I'm going tu impose rt:stilution in
your case of the amount of$1,605.41 tu Mr. Minton. I
will sign a civil judgment in that amount upon
presentment. An)1hing further from the defense?

along with the plea agreement in this case. And it's

4 very seldom that this C.0t1rt does not go along with the
5 plea agn:emenl in this case. And I think if the
Court •• if lhe Court had heen adequately informed
that •· well, r shouldn't say that.
If the Court had some justification that
California would prosecute you, I probably may have gone
along with the plea agreement in this case. l have
things to consider. This Court has things to consider
under what's cnlled the Toohill sentencing factors in
this case. And the primary one of those is the
protection of society. And in this case the Court finds
that society does need certain amount of protection due
to your ongoing criminal activity over the years.
Arid it •• the Court is a bit miffed that
California, neither California nor Wisconsin will deal
with this matter, so this Court will •• is •• feels
obligated to do so in this case.
The Court questions the ability of your
rehabilitation, whether or not that could actually
happen in this mallt:r. Tht: Court also finds that
because of your past record in this matter, that
punishment is a greater factor than it no1111ally would be
30
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MS. MARSl-w.L: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: From the state?

MR. ROBINS: No, your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Good luck to you, Mr. Spitzer.
(Matter adjourned.)
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